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THE SERPENT BEGUILED ME AND I DID EAT*
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
POLICE participation in some aspect of a crime is a common method of law
enforcement. Decoy letters are sent to trap postal thieves; officers dress up
as drunks and wait to be rolled; plainclothesmen resist homosexual advances
only after the suspect has done enough to allow the police to obtain a con-
viction. So far, none of these methods has been subjected to judicial super-
vision.1 The courts do intervene, however, when the police actively initiate
or solicit 2 a crime in order to prosecute. The most obvious manifestation of
such intervention is the judicially created doctrine that certain methods of
police solicitation constitute entrapment, which serves as a complete defense
against conviction for the solicited crime.
*Judge Parker, writing in Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 1932).
[The defendant's allegation of entrapment,] as was well said in Board of Com'rs
of Excise of Onundaga County v. Backus, 29 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 33, 'Would be but
the repetition of the plea as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise:
'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.' That defense was overruled by the great
Lawgiver and whatever estimate we may form, or whatever judgment pass upon
the character or conduct of the tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield
crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is, safe to say that under any code of
civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will."
Judge Parker was reversed by the Supreme Court, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
1. See discussion in both the majority and concurring opinions in Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 453 (1932).
2. In this, as in other areas of the law, it is often difficult to distinguish between activ-
ity and purposeful inactivity. See, e.g., this recent news item:
LOS ANGELES (AP) - The police say a pickpocket tried to dip into a pocket
belonging to a lawman and got caught.
"I was sure they were pickpockets even before I got on the bus," said Oscar
O'Lear, a member of the Police Department pickpocket detail. Mr. O'Lear, who
was Christmas shopping off-duty, sat next to one of the men.
Almost immediately he felt a tugging at the wallet in his pocket, he said later,
After the man had invested 15 minutes of patient labor to get the wallet, Mr. O'Lear
put the finger on him and his "partner."
N.Y. Times, Monday, December 21, 1964, p. 21, col. 3.
This Note will not be concerned with distinguishing between solicitation and its near
equivalents, except to suggest that the test ought not to depend exclusively on "Year Book
distinctions between feasance and nonfeasance," Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but also on the presence or absence of the charac-
teristic dangers of solicitation. These dangers are maximized when the police select a par-
ticular individual and offer him a criminal opportunity which might not otherwise have
been available. Officer O'Lear's conduct probably should be considered solicitation If he
passively encouraged the attempt.
ENTRAPMENT
Now in its fiftieth year, the entrapment defense has been widely criticized
as a failure.3 Its objective - preventing the police from turning innocent
men into criminals - is almost universally accepted. But this objective has
been frustrated by ambiguous standards, unresponsive appellate courts and
prejudicial trial procedures. This Note will argue that the basic objective of
the entrapment defense is dictated by the Constitution, and that the current
formulation of the defense falls so short of realizing this purpose as to be
unconstitutional. Consistent adherence to this constitutional imperative would
produce an entrapment defense, binding on the states as well as the federal
government 5 which is broader in scope and sharper in definition than the
current doctrine.
The leading federal case on entrapment is Sorrells v. United States.0 The
issue in Sorrell was whether the conduct of Martin, a prohibition agent, jus-
tified submitting the issue of entrapment to the jury. Martin, an old war buddy
of the defendant, paid him what turned out to be a business call. Martin sug-
gested that Sorrells sell him a half gallon of liquor; Sorrells replied that
"he did not fool with whiskey." Martin pressed the point and, one hour and
several requests later, Sorrells produced the liquor. Martin then made the
arrest which was the purpose of his visit. There was no evidence that the
defendant had ever violated the liquor laws prior to the solicitation. 7 The
trial court refused to give instructions on entrapment and was upheld by
the Fourth Circuit.8 The circuit court affirmed the principle that "the purpose
3. See, e.g., Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L.
REv. 245 (1947); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and
Agents Provocateurs, 60 YAu L.J. 1091, 1098-1115 (1951); Note, Entrapmnent, 73 HAR.
L. REv. 1333 (1960). In 1933 Judge Learned Hand approached the entrapment doctrine
with somber resignation:
The decisions are plentiful, but the judges generally content themselves vith decid-
ing the case on the evidence before them; we have been unable to extract from them
any definite doctrine, and it seems unprofitable once more merely to catalogue the
citations.
United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933). By 1957 four Supreme Court
Justices were willing to characterize the current entrapment doctrines as "gropingly...
express[ting] the feeling of outrage at conduct of law enforcers ... but without the for-
mulated basis in reason that is the first duty of courts to construct . . . " Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (concurring opinion).
4. The entrapment defense has been accepted in 43 states, rejected in only two 7
New York and Tennessee. Comment, The Doctrine of Entrapment and Its Application in
Texas, 9 Sw. L.J. 456, 465 (1955). But only rarely has it been successfully invoked by a
defendant in state courts. Donnelly, supra note 3, at 1106 n.42.
5. Throughout this Note, "due process" will be used to refer to the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Fourteenth amendment cases are used to demon-
strate the due process dimensions of the entrapment defense as applied to the states. The
requirements placed on the federal government by the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment are certainly no less severe. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1948) ; Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
6. 287 U.S. 435, reversing 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1932).
7. Id. at 439-41.
8. 57 F.2d 973.
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of solicitation is not to make criminals, but to detect those who are engaged
in criminal practices."9 But it rejected the entrapment defense on the theory
that even improper solicitation cannot excuse a violation of a criminal statute.10
The Supreme Court accepted the Fourth Circuit's view of the proper pur-
poses of solicitation and attributed them to Congress as well: "Congress
could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting
innocent persons into violations."' 1 As a result of this statutory construction,
the Court held that acquittal was the remedy for improper solicitation. Thus
the failure to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury required a new trial.
While condemning improper solicitation, the Court did not specify which
aspects of the police conduct in Sorrells were improper. The objective of
limiting solicitation to the detection of crime might have been sought by im-
posing any or all of three limitations on police conduct. Violations of all
three were involved in Sorrells, but the opinion does not make clear whether
violation of any one would give rise to the entrapment defense. An initial
limitation on police conduct would be to require that reasonable grounds be
shown in advance for believing that the solicitee is engaged in criminal ac-
tivity. As search and seizure law recognizes, a restriction ori invasion of
privacy will be totally ineffective if the police can use information obtained
from the invasion to justify their conduct.12 A second restriction, which would
limit the permissible targets of solicitation, would allow conviction for a
solicited offense only if it appears reasonably certain that the defendant would
have committed a similar offense in the absence of solicitation. This limitation
would prevent solicitation from being used to create crime; in particular, it
would protect the man who has "gone straight" from being lured back into
crime.13 Third, police methods of solicitation might be controlled by prohibit-
ing the use of coercion. Coercing a suspect into committing a crime would
seem a fortiori to be inconsistent with the postulated congressional intent.
Coercion, moreover, lessens the probability that the defendant would have
committed a similar crime without the solicitation.
While the Sorrells opinion does not explicitly adopt any of these standards,
it places heavy emphasis on the second limitation. The Court stressed the
absence of proof that Sorrells was engaged in a course of criminal conduct,
and it implied that conviction is permissible only if the solicitee had a "criminal
9. Id. at 975.
10. "It is time to get back to fundamentals. The law is supreme. No man may violate
it with impunity." Id. at 978.
11. Summary of Sorrells in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1957).
12. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 188 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
13. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed,
Past crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him to police practices,
aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from which the ordinary citizen is pro.
tected. The whole ameliorative hopes of modern penology and prison administration
strongly counsel against such a view.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1957) (concurring opinion).
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predisposition and design."' 4 In other words, solicitation is justified only
when it provides the defendant with a victim for a crime he previously had
intended to commit. State and lower federal courts, however, have concentrated
almost exclusively on the implied limitation against coercion by reducing
the limitation rekarding permissible targets to one which can never be violated
in the absence of coercion. In their view, "ready complaisance" with a solici-
tation indicates ;both that coercion was absent and that the defendant was
an appropriate target for solicitation.'5 Under this formulation of the entrap-
ment defense, the police may solicit anyone in the hope that the solicitation
will provide its own justification.
Any test, however, which allows unlimited solicitation and conviction of
all those who succumb is inconsistent with the Constitution. The due process
clause permits deprivation of liberty only in order to accomplish a legitimate
objective of society.' - Unlimited ability to solicit satisfies no such interest.
In Sherman v. United States, the other major Supreme Court decision on
entrapment, the concurring justices observed:
The power of government is abused and directed to an end for which
it was not constituted when employed to promote rather than detect crime
14. According to Sorrells,
the controlling question [is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent
whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the prod-
uct of the creative activity of its own officials. [In answering this question] [t]he
predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant.
287 U.S. 435, 451. The phrase "alleged offense" is ambiguous. If it refers to the par-
ticular offense for which the defendant is tried, then all solicitation runs afoul of the en-
trapment doctrine. The solicited offense is always the product of the creative activity of
government officials, since it is planned and invited by them. But the entrapment defense
is not nearly this broad. It assumes proper dimensions if the "alleged offense" is taken to
mean an offense except for the fact of a different victim.
15. See, e.g., Kivette v. United States, 230 F2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956); United States
v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1959). Two opinions of Learned Hand recognize that the
"ready complaisance!' of the defendant is not necessarily related to a pre-existing course
of criminal conduct, while holding that complaisance alone can serve as a post hoc justifi-
cation for solicitation. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933) ; United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (an earlier stage of the prosecution
involved in the Sherman case.) The Supreme Court opinion reversing Sherman's second
conviction does not repudiate the "ready complaisance" doctrine, but suggests that com-
plaisance must be proved by some evidence of intent, design or past conduct. 356 U.S. 369,
375 (1955).
16. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943). The
substantive due process cases also establish this proposition; the Court's more liberal con-
ception of a legitimate state interest in the sphere of economic legislation does not alter
the prohibition against arbitrary legislative deprivation of liberty. Compare Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (".... the exercise of legislative authority to
abridge [freedom of contract] can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circum-
stances."), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process").
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and to- bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might
well have obeyed the law.17
Of course, it can be argued that the government has an interest in punishing
all those who violate its laws, regardless of the way in which the violation
came about. But this notion of the interest involved depends upon overlooking
half of a single scheme; the government's interest cannot be confined to the
stage of punishment and ignored at the stage of violation.18 Solicitation for
the sake of obtaining convictions transforms a law to promote the general
welfare into a technique designed to foster disobedience in order to punish.
It has also been argued that a defendant who violates the law at the instiga-
tion of a police officer is morally as guilty as one who is induced by a private
party to act criminally.' 9 But there is no state interest in punishing a defendant
because of his moral guilt unless he has harmed another individual or society
at large.20 Since a solicited offense is contrived and controlled by the police,
it is difficult to see how it could be harmful to society. If, however, successful
solicitation does produce harmful conduct, then the practice itself could hardly
serve a legitimate state goal, for the police themselves would have promoted
the injurious act. Even under the rationale of moral guilt, therefore, a con-
viction based on unlimited solicitation would be prohibited by the due process
clause.
Unlimited solicitation would also violate the act requirement and its un-
derlying policies. Some act 21 attributable to the defendant is one of the tra-
ditional and universal elements of criminal liability and would seem to be
an essential feature of due process.22 This requirement is not merely an in-
17. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1955) (concurring opinion)
(emphasis added).
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Thus, in search and seizure cases, the constitutional wrong involves both the initial police
misconduct and the validation of such misconduct by a court which accepts illegally seized
evidence. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). Similarly, the evil of entrap-
ment comprises both approaching an innocent man to lure him into crime, and punishing
him once he has succumbed. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1932).
19. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 972, 975 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 287 U.S.
435 (1932) ; Mikell, supra note '3, at 264.
20. Thus, laws which prohibit private consensual behavior are justified by their sup-
porters on the theory that the prohibited behavior hurts society, not simply that it is im-
moral. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 62, 116 N.E. 275, 276 (1917),
referring to anti-contraceptive statutes. See also Report of the British Roman Catholic
Advisory Committee on Prostitution and Homosexual Offenses and the Existinq Law,
reprinted in DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRmiiNAL LAW 140.41 (1962).
" 21. An act may be an omission of a specifically prescribed legal duty. The essential
requirement is that-criminal liability-be based on conduct which is subject to voluntary
control.
22. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a
state could not, consistently with the due process clause, punish a man for being a narcotics
addict. The Court noted that the defendant could be punished for the act of using nar-
cotics.
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heritance from the retributive theory of justice; basic considerations of political
power are involved. The act requirement limits the power of police and
prosecutors by allowing them to select defendants for punishment only from
among those whose criminal potential has ripened into overt acts. If an act
were not required, police and prosecutor could select as defendants anyone
- or everyone - with criminal potential. Very few of us are not within
this class of imperfect human beings.3 Indeed, unlimited power to prosecute
and to punish is a defining characteristic of absolutism - from medieval
tyranny to the modem police state.24 Unlimited power to solicit illegal acts
would circumvent the act requirement since the police would have it in their
power to turn almost anyone into a defendant by selecting a means designed
to exploit his particular weakness. Even if the act requirement is not itself
an element of due process, the limitation on state power which it is designed
to accomplish would seem to be fundamental to the concept of "ordered
liberty."25 Thus the due process clause suggests that the police must select
targets for solicitation on the basis of some criterion which accomplishes a
legitimate state purpose and which imposes some limit on the state's ability
to select defendants.
It might be thought that allowing solicitation of the "dangerous" - people
who are thought especially likely to commit a crime - would be an appropriate
limitation on the targets of solicitation. Such a limitation would establish a
standard falling between untrammelled power to solicit and power to solicit
only those engaged in a course of criminal conduct or those having an im-
mediate disposition to commit an offense - the test implicit in Sorrells.
But any such "dangerousness" test must be rejected for the same reasons
which led to the determination that unlimited solicitation would be uncon-
stitutional. Dangerousness, if it is not to be proved by past conduct or criminal
design, is inherently incapable of any definition which would prevent it from
becoming unlimited power to solicit. A strict test for dangerousness might
demand a showing of high probability that the defendant would commit a
similar crime at some time in the future. But since most people are likely to
commit some crime - be it a traffic violation, adultery or loitering in a public
place - during their remaining life span, the test would still be tantamount
to -an unlimited power to select solicitation targets. An even more restrictive
test could be established by considering people dangerous only if they are
likely to commit a crime in the near future. But if proximity to crime is not
to be determined by continuing criminal conduct or an immediate criminal
disposition, the trier of fact would be left without firm standards on which
23. See Freud, "Criminals From A Sense of Guilt," 14 Comm=xxr- Ps cnwOGcAL
WoRxs oF SIGmUND FRuD 332-33 (1957).
24. See, e.g, 1111 37 & 43, The Record & Process of the Deposition of Richard II, III
RoTuI PARLiimmorum 416, 420 (3d ed. 1832) ; SH~nEn, TnE RISE AND FAU. op TInE
THmD RE=cH (1960) ; KoEsrLER, DARKNESS AT NooN (1941).
25. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1938).
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to base a highly specific prediction of human behavior.20 Of course, the prose-
cutor might introduce psychiatric testimony. But psychiatry does not claim
the ability to make tolerably accurate predictions of such behavior.27 More-
over, the law has not taken the far-reaching step of basing criminal liability
solely on psychiatric projection, and there would seem to be no reason to
introduce this procedure into the context of solicitation.28 Finally, allowing
the state to entice dangerous people into crime is destructive of the act re-
quirement, because it allows the state to substitute a contrived act for a spon-
taneous offense. Convicting a man simply on the basis that he is likely to
harm society in the future is offensive to Anglo-American legal practice"
and, in all likelihood, to the Constitution."0
The constitutional standards - the act requirement and the advancement
of a legitimate goal of the state3 - would, however, be satisfied by a test
26. Bad acts and reputation testimony might be introduced in an effort to prove that
the defendant would have committed a similar crime in the near future. But the result of
considering such neighborhood gossip to be probative would be to allow solicitation of
anyone whose life has not been blameless.
27. See Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on
the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
28. Psychiatric projection of dangerousness has been used in determining whether
defendants who have been acquitted solely by reason of insanity should be released from a
mental hospital. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII, 1960). In these eases, the
state's right to detain the defendant follows from his unprompted commission of a forbid-
den act. A decision that he should not be released is like a decision denying parole, and
can be based on less reliable evidence than is required for a criminal conviction. See
generally Goldstein & Katz, supra note 27.
29. See Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERmiNISM AND FREEDOM IN
THE AGE OF MODERN ScIENcE 109-12 (Hook ed. 1958).
30. Cf. the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, as Circuit Justice in Williamson v. United
States, 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950), granting bail to convicted communists who were
awaiting decision on a petition for certiorari:
If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act
helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional
American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet
uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsum-
mated offenses is so unprecedented and so fraught with danger of excesses and in-
justice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to
supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which the defendants stand con-
victed.
Id. at 282-83.
The same point was made by a federal district court in allowing the discharge of a
mental patient who was evaluated by the hospital as "potentially dangerous to others and
if released is likely to repeat his pattern of criminal behavior, and might commit homi-
cide." In the Matter of Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958).
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), discussed in note 22 supra, narcotics
addicts posed as high a likelihood of committing future crimes (possession, use, sale) as
is ever likely to be found. Yet a conviction based on addiction alone, without proof of a
past act, was unconstitutional.
31. The constitutional status of the entrapment defense has been dealt with only in a
bizarre opinion by the Seventh Circuit and in two contradictory opinions by identical Ninth
[Vol. 74: 942
ENTRAPMENT
which adhered to the limitation on target selection implicit in Sorrells: the
solicitee must have been engaged in a course of criminal conduct or must
have been on the verge of a crime. Such a test would operate to confine solici-
tation to the obviously legitimate purpose of detecting rather than creating
crime. And the criminal conduct or design test is intended to insure that
the solicited offense is only a substitute for a criminal act which the defendant
would have committed without the solicitation. Thus the power of the state
to select defendants would be subject to essentially the same limitation as
is imposed by the act requirement.
The two auxiliary limitations on police solicitation suggested by the facts
in Sorrells - the requirement that the police have probable cause prior to
solicitation and the prohibition against coercion - seem also to be of constitu-
Circuit panels dealing with the same case. In United States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois, 329
F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964), the court intimated that the Constitution prohibits the practice
of entrapment, but held that it does not protect an individual victim - at least in a state
which takes generally effective action against the practice. The court observed that
When the several states have consistently discharged their responsibility to society
in giving full recognition of their constidtistonal obligation to prevent the prostitu-
tion of state judicial power through lawless enforcement of the criminal law, the
need for federal intervention is not apparent.
Id. at 359-60 (emphasis added).
This view of the fourteenth amendment owes little to its language. The amendment
purports to protect the liberty of persons, not the chastity of power. Denial of due process
of law refers primarily to exceptional deviation from the regular course of judicial pro-
ceedings; the rarity of the abuse only emphasizes the deviation. An individual defendant
whose treatment by a state "shocks the conscience" cannot be barred from federal relief
simply because other defendants are more fairly treated or other states are better behaved.
The court in Hall relies on Mapp v. Ohio, 267 U.S. 643 (1961), to support the view that
the due process clause is inoperative in the absence of widespread state misconduct. But
the Mapp opinion made clear that a single instance of state misconduct is sufficient to in-
voke the Constitution:
[N]othing could be more certain than that when a coerced confession is involved,
"the relevant rules of evidence" are overridden without regard to "the incidence of
such conduct by the police," slight or frequent. Why should not the same rule apply
to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure... P
Id. at 656.
In view of its novel conception of the fourteenth amendment and its miscitation of
Mapp, the Hall case cannot be taken to settle the constitutional status of the entrapment
defense.
In Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), the court held that a claim
of entrapment, if valid, would establish a violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. After a district court hearing on the merits, the same panel held per curiam
that the petitioner had raised no constitutional question by his allegation that the trial
court's instruction on entrapment was insufficient. Banks v. United States, 258 F.2d 318
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958). One case has interpreted the second Banks
decision as repudiating the first. Simmons v. United States, 302 F2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1962).
But a Ninth Circuit decision has cited the second Batks case for the more limited proposi-
tion that errors in instructions must be corrected on appeal and cannot be reached in a
federal post-conviction relief proceeding. Cambiano v. United States, 295 F2d 13, 14 (9th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 999 (1962).
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tional status. Since due process limits solicitation to the purpose of crime
detection, constitutional restrictions upon methods of gathering evidence pro-
vide persuasive analogies. Indeed, the Supreme Court suggested these analogies
in Sherman, where it equated entrapment with the unlawful search or the
coerced confession. 82 Because permissible solicitation is functionally equivalent
to police efforts to obtain confessions, the constitutional protection against
coercion should apply. The basic objectives of solicitation and interrogation
are identical - to induce the defendant to supply evidence of his guilt. And
the methods used share a crucial feature; in each case the police do not
merely collect extrinsic evidence, but actively entice the defendant to in-
criminate himself. The only meaningful difference is that in the case of solici-
tation the police disguise their identity-3 and elicit non-verbal 84 conduct
which the defendant does not realize will be used against him.
- Thus a crucial question in all solicitation cases should be whether the police
conduct constituted "coercion," as that term has been defined in the coerced
confession cases. The Supreme Court has recently observed in Malloy v.
Hogan 35 that the constitutional test of a confession
. . . . is whether the confession was "free and voluntary: that is, [it]
must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained
by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influence . ..
The Court added that the fourteenth amendment also "prohibits the States
from inducing a person to confess through 'sympathy falsely aroused,' ....
[It secures] the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will."
81
32. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
33. Coercion should not be considered less unconstitutional when it is applied by an
undercover agent. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court
held that the defendant's right to counsel during interrogation - a right granted hm
largely in order to protect against coercion - applied to interrogations conducted by an
informer. The Court observed:
It is true that in the Spano case the defendant was interrogated in a police station,
while here the damaging testimony was elicited from the defendant without hI
knowledge while he was free on bail. But, as Judge Hays points out in his dissent
in the Court of Appeals, "If such a rule is to have any efficacy it must apply to in-
direct and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse."
In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even
know he was under interrogation by a government agent.
Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
34. Verbal conduct alone is often sufficient to constitute a crime - see, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 176(b) (1958) (conspiracy to sell heroin to a juvenile, which carries a possible death
penalty). In some cases, solicitation seems to be commonly used to elicit verbal crimes.
See Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (reversing a conviction for n-
lawfully inviting a person to accompany one for a lewd and immoral purpose; here the
officers solicited passers-by in a Washington park).
35. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 8.
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The rationale behind this strict standard is one that allows no distinction
between solicitation and interrogation:
[The voluntariness test] reflects recognition that the American system
of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay .... Governments,
state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion
prove a charge against the accused out of his own mouth. a
Similarly, the government should not be allowed to coerce a person into sup-
plying by his conduct the elements of an offense. It is unreasonable to suppose
that the Constitution protects a person against confession of an actual crime
and not against commission of a staged offense, as if tempting a man to be
honest were more reprehensible than tempting him to be wicked.
In applying the coercion doctrine to solicitation, however, the courts should
bear in mind the differences between open police interrogation and under-
cover solicitation. The innately coercive atmosphere of the police station is
absent in the latter case; thus the same conduct by an officer may be per-
missible when he solicits a crime but prohibited when he demands a confession.-I
Additionally, the role of money differs in the two cases. A bought confession
is presumably one which the defendant would not have made voluntarily. But
the exchange of money may be an essential part of the solicitation - for ex-
ample, when a narcotics agent buys a fix. Unless the offering price is excessive
or the defendant peculiarly weak-willed, the defendant should not be allowed
to claim that his will was overborne by the offer of the purchase price.
The constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures sug-
gests another limitation on permissible solicitation. Like a police search, solici-
tation involves an intrusion into privacy. The kinds of privacy involved are
different - the privacy of one's premises in the first case, the privacy of one's
will and disposition in the second case. But certainly the right to be free
from official enticement into crime is no less important than the right to be
free from physical encroachments aimed at detecting crime. If either right is
to be invaded by the government, it must be for a substantial cause. Solicitation
should be confined to those reasonably suspected of criminal conduct or design,
thus limiting the invasion of privacy inherent in police solicitation to those
.people who could constitutionally be tried for a solicited offense. Some cases
suggest this restriction on solicitation, but leave enforcement entirely to the
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. For example, a soliciting officer would have to be permitted to assure a skeptical
solicitee that he will tell no one about the transaction. But a police interrogator is prob-
ably required to inform the suspect that anything he says may be used against him. See
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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trial stage.40 This approach, however, fails entirely to protect those who do
not succumb, or who cannot constitutionally be convicted, from the invasion
of personal integrity that solicitation involves. An independent judgment by
a magistrate prior to solicitation would avoid this pitfall. An official British
report has recognized the need for safeguarding privacy and has proposed
that the police be required to obtain a warrant from a magistrate before
soliciting a person to commit an offense. 41 The fourth amendment would sug-
gest a similar procedure prior to solicitation.42
In summary, the Constitution establishes three independent limitations
on police conduct; breach of any one giving rise to a valid entrapment defense.
The privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the use of coercion in solici-
tation. Due process forbids the conviction of any person for a solicited offense
unless he had been engaged in a course of criminal conduct or had a criminal
design. And the prohibition against search and seizure requires the police
to have reasonable grounds for suspecting such conduct or design before
they engage in solicitation. And by acknowledged operation of the fourteenth
amendment, each of these three limitations is applicable to the state, as well
as the federal government.
Correlative to the constitutional limitations on police solicitation is the re-
quirement that an effective means be provided for acquitting victims of un-
constitutional solicitation.43 But so long as the defendant is being tried for
the solicited offense rather than for his past conduct or criminal design, the
constitutional limitations will be difficult to enforce at the trial. The basic
problem is whether or not to let the jury decide whether the defendant was
a proper target for solicitation. This issue has divided the Supreme Court
40. See, e.g., Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950); C. M, Spring
Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926).
41. REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMMIssION ON POLCE POWERS AND PROCEDURE (Cmd.
No. 3997) 42 (1929), quoted in Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1114 n.65 (1951).
42. As the Supreme Court observed in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive business of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
43. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), where the Court found that the New
York procedure for determining the admissibility of an allegedly coerced confession did
not adequately protect the rights of the accused.
The procedures used in the trial court to arrive at its conclusions on the coercion
issue progressively take on added significance as the actual measure of the protec-
tion afforded a defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against the use of involuntary confessions. These procedures must, therefore,
be fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntari-




in both of its major entrapment decisions,4 and each alternative solution has
major defects. If the decision is left to the jury, there is a substantial danger
that the jury will infer either a course of criminal conduct or a criminal design
from the -very fact of successful solicitation, thus effectively frustrating the
constitutional limitations on solicitation. 45 One approach to this problem would
be to remove the issue of past conduct or design from jury consideration. But
this issue seems particularly appropriate for jury decision because it is an
essential part of the basis for punishment and because it involves the questions
of credibility and motivation. The entrapment defense would seem to be as
much a jury question as insanity or self-defense. In addition, taking this issue
from the jury might conflict with constitutional guarantees of a jury trial,
at least within the federal system.48
Conceivably, the issue of permissible solicitation could be decided in the
first instance by the judge; if he ruled against the defendant, the same issue
would then be submitted to the jury for independent resolution. But a more
straightforward and effective method of realizing the basically evidentiary
purpose of solicitation would be to give procedural effect to that purpose. The
fact of a successful solicitation would not in itself give rise to criminal lia-
bility; it would only be relevant as evidence of an independently existing
course of criminal conduct. Treating a successful solicitation as evidence of
a past crime would eliminate several defects inherent in trials for the solicited
offense. First, this procedure would not be subject to the existing tendency
to admit highly prejudicial past crimes and reputation testimony which is not
strongly probative on the issues of a continuing course of criminal conduct
or of an immediate disposition to commit crime.47 Rather, liability would only
44. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sor-
rells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
. 45. The New York procedure which was found unconstitutional in Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, involved closely analogous dangers. New York allowed the jury to deter-
mine the voluntariness of an allegedly coerced confession. The Supreme Court felt that a
jury which found the confession trustworthy would be under pressure to find it voluntary
in order to send a guilty man to jail. Alternatively, a jury which found the confession
involuntary would nonetheless have it firmly implanted in its mind. id. at 388.
46. Trial by jury is guaranteed by the Constitution, both in Art. 3, § 2 and the sixth
amendment, and in many state constitutions. In a federal criminal case, the guarantee is
violated when the judge decides one of the essential elements of the crime. United States
v. Manuszak, 234 F2d 421 (3d Cir. 1956); Carothers v. United States, 161 F.2d 718, 722
(5th Cir. 1947).
State constitutional provisions requiring a jury trial in civil cases have been held to
require that particular issues be submitted to the jury - e.g., probable cause in a suit for
malicious prosecution, Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 493, 172 S.E. 870 (1934),
and that the issue of liability as well as damages be open to jury consideration after a
verdict has been set aside for excessive damages. In re Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass.
606, 94 N.E. 846 (1911).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 208 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 928 (1954); Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134 (D. Min. 1926).
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be based on unpunished past conduct; the solicited behavior, if closely related
and probative, would be admissible to prove the past crime, 'and all bad acts
testimony other than the fact of successful solicitation would be governed by
the usual restrictive rules of evidence. Second, the current tendency to predi-
cate a previous course of criminal conduct as a prerequisite to conviction for
a solicited offense, but to infer the previous course from the successful solici-
tation, would be eliminated. Finally, removing the source of improper in-
ferences would allow recognition of the proper role of the jury.
Using the results of solicitation as evidence of prior crimes would result in
one substantive change in the test derived from Sorrells. Criminal design alone
could not be a ground for conviction, because it would involve no prior criminal
conduct which could be prosecuted with the aid of solicited evidence. This
change, however, should not significantly decrease the permissible scope of
solicitation, since the police will seldom know of the criminal design of a
person who has not previously engaged in a course of criminal conduct, and
since it is unlikely that a solicitation warrant could be obtained on the basis
of speculation about design alone. If police knowledge is based on more than
speculation, it is likely to be derived from acts sufficient to allow conviction
for some crime - for example, attempt, conspiracy, criminal solicitation,
possession. 48 Moreover, allowing solicitation of those not engaged in a course
of criminal conduct represents a deviation from the act requirement, even if
the criminal design test does place equivalent restrictions on state power. No
amount of proof of criminal design can guarantee that the defendant would
have committed the act without the state's intervention.
The constitutional doctrine suggested by this Note, in addition to estab-
lishing the due process status of an entrapment defense, would limit the per-
missible targets and methods of solicitation to a narrower range than per-
mitted by administration of existing doctrine. The most likely objection to
this narrow formulation of permissible solicitation is that it would severely
hamper law enforcement. Many have argued that solicitation is necessary to
detect crimes of consent, such as narcotics offenses and prostitution.40 All the
participants in such crimes are subject to criminal liability. Since the immediate
victims of the crime are also its perpetrators, they may refrain from reporting
it either from fear of prosecution or because they are content to be victimized.
Thus society cannot rely on receiving proof of past acts by voluntary disclosure.
But this view has not been supported on factual grounds. Criminals of the
type described deal with hundreds of customers, not all of whom will be
satisfied. Malice, moral reawakening or the desire to be useful to the police
may lead many to confess. Threats of prosecution and promises of immunity
48. One purpose of current solicitation practices may be to allow the police to arrest
a defendant whom they know to be guilty of an offense for a more serious offense of the
same general nature.
49. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Roberts' concurring opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 453-54 (1932); Note, Entrapment, 73 HA.v. L. REv. 1333, 1338 (1960); Note,
Entrapment by Government Officials, 28 COLum. L. REv. 1067, 1069 (1928).
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are the standard, and highly effective, means of persuading participants to
tell their stories to the police. If prostitutes or narcotics peddlers go un-
punished, public apathy or police corruption are as likely e.-planations as
unavailability of evidence. Arguments from practical necessity, unsupported
by convincing proof, should not make us less willing to give full effect to
constitutional guarantees. In any event, the convenience of questionable police
methods is not the ultimate test of their constitutionality. A society which
ranks personal integrity above the goal of obtaining convictions need not
tolerate coercive or unoccasioned solicitation.
